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representations were made

  • 1 представление

    с.
    1. presentation; (о документах тж.) handing-in
    2. театр. performance
    3. ( понятие) idea, notion, conception

    иметь представление (о пр.) — have an idea / notion (about)

    он не имеет ни малейшего представления — he hasn't the slightest idea, или the remotest conception; he hasn't the haziest notion

    давать представление (о пр.) — give* an idea (of)

    4. офиц. representation

    Русско-английский словарь Смирнитского > представление

  • 2 представление

    с.
    1) ( предъявление) presentation
    2) (подача - заявок, отчётов и т.п.) submission, filing

    представле́ние отчётности — reporting

    3) (вид, способ показа) presentation, representation; view

    представле́ние в десяти́чной систе́ме информ. — decimal notation

    спо́соб представле́ния да́нных информ. — representation method / medium

    4) ( при знакомстве) introduction
    5) (фирмы, продукции и т.п.) presentation
    6) ( зрелище) performance, show

    цирково́е представле́ние — circus show

    7) ( понятие) idea, notion, conception

    име́ть представле́ние (о пр.) — have an idea / notion (about)

    он не име́ет ни мале́йшего представле́ния — he hasn't got the slightest idea [the remotest conception; the haziest notion]

    дава́ть представле́ние (о пр.) — give an idea (of)

    име́ть я́сное представле́ние о положе́нии дел — have a clear view of the situation

    8) дип. representation

    бы́ли сде́ланы представле́ния — representations were made

    9)

    представле́ние кого́-л к награ́де — nomination of smb for an award

    Новый большой русско-английский словарь > представление

  • 3 Vitruvius Pollio

    [br]
    b. early first century BC
    d. c. 25 BC
    [br]
    Roman writer on architecture and engineering subjects.
    [br]
    Nothing is known of Vitruvius apart from what can be gleaned from his only known work, the treatise De architectura. He seems to have been employed in some capacity by Julius Caesar and continued to serve under his heir, Octavianus, later Emperor Augustus, to whom he dedicated his book. It was written towards the end of his life, after Octavianus became undisputed ruler of the Empire by his victory at Actium in 31 BC, and was based partly on his own experience and partly on earlier, Hellenistic, writers.
    The De architectura is divided into ten books. The first seven books expound the general principles of architecture and the planning, design and construction of various types of building, public and domestic, including a consideration of techniques and materials. Book 7 deals with interior decoration, including stucco work and painting, while Book 8 treats water supply, from the location of sources to the transport of water by aqueducts, tunnels and pipes. Book 9, after a long and somewhat confused account of the astronomical theories of the day, describes various forms of clock and sundial. Finally, Book 10 deals with mechanical devices for handling building materials and raising and pumping water, for which Vitruvius draws on the earlier Greek authors Ctesibius and Hero.
    Although this may seem a motley assembly of subjects, to the Roman architect and builder it was a logical compendium of the subjects he was expected to know about. At the time, Vitruvius' rigid rules for the design of buildings such as temples seem to have had little influence, but his accounts of more practical matters of building materials and techniques were widely used. His illustrations to the original work were lost in antiquity, for no later manuscript includes them. Through the Middle Ages, manuscript copies were made in monastic scriptoria, although the architectural style in vogue had little relevance to those in Vitruvius: these came into their own with the Italian Renaissance. Alberti, writing the first great Renaissance treatise on architecture from 1452 to 1467, drew heavily on De architectura; those who sought to revive the styles of antiquity were bound to regard the only surviving text on the subject as authoritative. The appearance of the first printed edition in 1486 only served to extend its influence.
    During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Vitruvius was used as a handbook for constructing machines and instruments. For the modern historian of technology and architecture the work is a source of prime importance, although it must be remembered that the illustrations in the early printed editions are of contemporary reproductions of ancient devices using the techniques of the time, rather than authentic representations of ancient technology.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    Of the several critical editions of De architectura there are the Teubner edition, 1899. ed. V.Rose, Leipzig; the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1962, ed. F.Granger, London: Heinemann, (with English trans. and notes); and the Collection Guillaume Budé with French trans. and full commentary, 10 vols, Paris (in progress).
    Further Reading
    Apart from the notes to the printed editions, see also: H.Plommer, 1973, Vitruvius and Later Roman Building Manuals, London. A.G.Drachmann, 1963, The Mechanical Technology of Greek and Roman Antiquity Copenhagen and London.
    S.L.Gibbs, 1976, Greek and Roman Sundials, New Haven and London.
    LRD

    Biographical history of technology > Vitruvius Pollio

  • 4 misión

    f.
    1 mission, endeavor, commitment, cause.
    2 mission, errand, assignment.
    3 mission, sally, military mission.
    * * *
    1 (tarea) mission, task
    2 RELIGIÓN mission
    \
    irse a las misiones to become a missionary
    misión de buena voluntad goodwill mission
    misión diplomática diplomatic mission
    * * *
    noun f.
    * * *
    SF
    1) (=cometido) mission; (=tarea) task; (Pol) assignment
    2) (=delegación) mission
    3) pl misiones (Rel) overseas missions, missionary work sing
    * * *
    1) ( tarea) mission

    misión cumplida! — (fr hecha) mission accomplished!

    3) (Relig) mission
    * * *
    = mission, mission station, mission statement, charge, mission, mandate.
    Ex. Its mission is to advise the three sponsoring agencies on how best to coordinate their programs in this area and to recommend priorities for action.
    Ex. This South African library holds 2 of the 3 volumes of travel journals in which the Revd John Campbell of the London Missionary Society described his visit to mission stations in the Cape Colony.
    Ex. The mission statement is the statement made by a library concerning its provision and development of services and products.
    Ex. She was offered an opportunity to chair a task force within the library with the charge to investigate a new integrated system.
    Ex. His fascination with collecting pictorial representations of the old Spanish Franciscan missions in California is well known.
    Ex. The original mandate was very clear: to consider for inclusion all proposals made.
    ----
    * biblioteca de misión = mission library.
    * cumplir una misión = accomplish + mission.
    * definir una misión = formulate + mission.
    * desempeñar la misión de uno = do + Posesivo + work.
    * desempeñar una misión = fulfil + mission.
    * estudios relacionados con las misiones religiosas = missiology.
    * llevar a cabo una misión = accomplish + mission.
    * misión cumplida = mission accomplished.
    * misión de búsqueda y rescate = search and rescue mission.
    * misión de guerra = wartime mission.
    * misión de la biblioteca = library's mission.
    * misión diplomática = diplomatic mission.
    * misión espacial = space mission.
    * misión imposible = mission impossible.
    * misión inútil = fool's errand.
    * misión investigadora = fact-finding mission.
    * resumen de misión = mission-oriented abstract.
    * * *
    1) ( tarea) mission

    misión cumplida! — (fr hecha) mission accomplished!

    3) (Relig) mission
    * * *
    = mission, mission station, mission statement, charge, mission, mandate.

    Ex: Its mission is to advise the three sponsoring agencies on how best to coordinate their programs in this area and to recommend priorities for action.

    Ex: This South African library holds 2 of the 3 volumes of travel journals in which the Revd John Campbell of the London Missionary Society described his visit to mission stations in the Cape Colony.
    Ex: The mission statement is the statement made by a library concerning its provision and development of services and products.
    Ex: She was offered an opportunity to chair a task force within the library with the charge to investigate a new integrated system.
    Ex: His fascination with collecting pictorial representations of the old Spanish Franciscan missions in California is well known.
    Ex: The original mandate was very clear: to consider for inclusion all proposals made.
    * biblioteca de misión = mission library.
    * cumplir una misión = accomplish + mission.
    * definir una misión = formulate + mission.
    * desempeñar la misión de uno = do + Posesivo + work.
    * desempeñar una misión = fulfil + mission.
    * estudios relacionados con las misiones religiosas = missiology.
    * llevar a cabo una misión = accomplish + mission.
    * misión cumplida = mission accomplished.
    * misión de búsqueda y rescate = search and rescue mission.
    * misión de guerra = wartime mission.
    * misión de la biblioteca = library's mission.
    * misión diplomática = diplomatic mission.
    * misión espacial = space mission.
    * misión imposible = mission impossible.
    * misión inútil = fool's errand.
    * misión investigadora = fact-finding mission.
    * resumen de misión = mission-oriented abstract.

    * * *
    A (tarea) mission
    desempeñar/cumplir una misión to carry out/accomplish a mission o task
    ¡misión cumplida! ( fr hecha); mission accomplished!
    Compuestos:
    combat mission
    reconnaissance mission
    B
    (delegación): la misión científica que viajó al Polo Norte the team of scientists who went to the North Pole
    la misión (diplomática) española en la ONU the Spanish diplomatic delegation to the UN
    C ( Relig) mission
    * * *

     

    misión sustantivo femenino
    1 ( tarea) mission
    2 ( delegación):

    una misión diplomática a diplomatic delegation
    misión sustantivo femenino mission
    ' misión' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    cumplida
    - cumplido
    - cabo
    - encargo
    - expedición
    - operación
    English:
    assignment
    - handle
    - mission
    - recce
    - debriefing
    * * *
    1. [delegación] mission
    misión diplomática diplomatic delegation o Br mission
    2.
    misiones [religiosas] (overseas) missions
    3. [cometido] task, mission;
    ¡misión cumplida! mission accomplished!
    misión suicida suicide mission
    4. [expedición científica] expedition;
    una misión de la NASA a Marte a NASA mission to Mars
    MISIONES JESUÍTICAS
    The Jesuit missionaries working along the Paraná river (which today flows through Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) set up self-sufficient communities for the Guarani Indians from 1607 onwards. The communities had their own militias and cavalry for self-defence, and Spanish settlers were forbidden access. The Jesuits allowed for the Indians' religious practices and beliefs in their teaching of Christianity, and the missions gave them protection from the slavery practised outside. It was, however, their very success which led to their downfall, as they came to be regarded as a rival by the cities of Buenos Aires and Asunción. The missions were finally closed in 1767, leaving over 100,000 Indians to their fate. This Jesuit utopia in the jungle was undoubtedly a paternalistic affair, but it has acquired an almost mythical status with the passing years. A recent manifestation of this is the 1986 film “The Mission”.
    * * *
    f mission
    * * *
    misión nf, pl misiones : mission
    * * *
    misión n mission

    Spanish-English dictionary > misión

  • 5 correa

    f.
    1 strap.
    2 belt (Tec).
    3 purlin.
    pres.indicat.
    3rd person singular (él/ella/ello) present indicative of spanish verb: correar.
    imperat.
    2nd person singular (tú) Imperative of Spanish verb: correar.
    * * *
    1 (tira de piel) strap, leather strip
    2 (de perro) lead, leash
    3 (de reloj) watchstrap
    5 TÉCNICA belt
    6 (elasticidad) elasticity, stretch
    \
    tener mucha correa familiar to have a lot of patience
    correa sin fin conveyor belt
    * * *
    noun f.
    belt, strap
    * * *
    SF
    1) (=cinturón) belt; (=tira) strap; (=ronzal) tether; [para afilar una navaja] strop

    la correa de mi reloj — my watchstrap, my watchband (EEUU)

    2) [de perro] leash, lead
    3) (Mec)

    correa de transmisión — driving belt, drive

    correa de ventilador, correa del ventilador — (Aut) fan belt

    4) (=aguante) give, elasticity

    tener correa —

    por cualquier cosa se enfada, tiene muy poca correa — she gets angry at the slightest thing, she has a very short fuse

    * * *
    a) ( tira) strap; ( cinturón) belt; ( de perro) leash

    correa de reloj — watchband (AmE), watchstrap (BrE)

    b) ( para afilar) strop
    c) (Mec) belt

    tener mucha/poca correa — (fam) to be long-suffering/to have a very short fuse

    * * *
    = belt, thong, strap, halter, leash.
    Ex. The only modification made was the replacement of the light-weight belt or roller on the machine wire with the dandy roll, first used in 1825.
    Ex. Next the book was placed on the sewing frame, and the folded sheets were sewn by hand with needle and thread on to four or five cords or thongs.
    Ex. There are many varieties of sandal, from synthetic rope soles and straps, tyre-tread soled sandals, to the Japanese wooden sandals, which are relatively easy to make.
    Ex. The author studies medieval representations of Saint Anthony Abbot and his accompanying piglet on a halter.
    Ex. Rather than using a collar with a leash, cats should be walked using a proper harness designed specifically for felines.
    ----
    * accionado por correas = belt-driven.
    * correa de distribución = driving belt, timing belt, cambelt [cam belt].
    * correa del ventilador = fan belt.
    * correa elástica = bungee, bungee cord, elastic cord.
    * correa transportadora = conveyor belt, endless belt, conveyor [conveyer].
    * * *
    a) ( tira) strap; ( cinturón) belt; ( de perro) leash

    correa de reloj — watchband (AmE), watchstrap (BrE)

    b) ( para afilar) strop
    c) (Mec) belt

    tener mucha/poca correa — (fam) to be long-suffering/to have a very short fuse

    * * *
    = belt, thong, strap, halter, leash.

    Ex: The only modification made was the replacement of the light-weight belt or roller on the machine wire with the dandy roll, first used in 1825.

    Ex: Next the book was placed on the sewing frame, and the folded sheets were sewn by hand with needle and thread on to four or five cords or thongs.
    Ex: There are many varieties of sandal, from synthetic rope soles and straps, tyre-tread soled sandals, to the Japanese wooden sandals, which are relatively easy to make.
    Ex: The author studies medieval representations of Saint Anthony Abbot and his accompanying piglet on a halter.
    Ex: Rather than using a collar with a leash, cats should be walked using a proper harness designed specifically for felines.
    * accionado por correas = belt-driven.
    * correa de distribución = driving belt, timing belt, cambelt [cam belt].
    * correa del ventilador = fan belt.
    * correa elástica = bungee, bungee cord, elastic cord.
    * correa transportadora = conveyor belt, endless belt, conveyor [conveyer].

    * * *
    1 (tira) strap; (cinturón) belt
    la correa del perro the dog's leash o ( BrE) lead
    tengo que cambiarle la correa al reloj I need a new watchband ( AmE) o ( BrE) watchstrap
    3 ( Mec) belt
    tener mucha correa ( fam); to be long-suffering
    tener poca correa ( fam); to have a very short fuse
    Compuestos:
    ● correa de or del ventilador
    fan belt
    ( Mec) drive belt; ( Pol) mouthpiece
    * * *

     

    correa sustantivo femenino
    a) ( tira) strap;

    ( cinturón) belt;
    ( de perro) leash;

    b) (Mec) belt;


    correa sustantivo femenino
    1 (tira) strap
    (de reloj) watchstrap, US watchband
    (de pantalón) belt
    (de perro) lead, US leash
    2 Téc belt
    ♦ Locuciones: familiar tener correa, to be patient: no me canso, tengo correa para rato, I'm not tired; I can last a long time
    ' correa' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    reata
    English:
    belt
    - lead
    - leash
    - shoulder strap
    - strap
    - strap down
    - watchband
    - watchstrap
    - carousel
    - conveyor (belt)
    - fan
    - loop
    - shoulder
    - thong
    - watch
    - weal
    - wrist
    * * *
    correa nf
    1. [de bolso, reloj] strap;
    [cinturón] belt; [de perro] lead, leash
    2. Tec belt
    correa de transmisión drive belt;
    * * *
    f de perro leash, Br
    lead; de reloj strap; ( cinturón) belt;
    tener mucha correa fig be long-suffering
    * * *
    correa nf
    : strap, belt
    * * *
    1. (en general) strap
    3. (de perro) lead

    Spanish-English dictionary > correa

  • 6 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 7 Memory

       To what extent can we lump together what goes on when you try to recall: (1) your name; (2) how you kick a football; and (3) the present location of your car keys? If we use introspective evidence as a guide, the first seems an immediate automatic response. The second may require constructive internal replay prior to our being able to produce a verbal description. The third... quite likely involves complex operational responses under the control of some general strategy system. Is any unitary search process, with a single set of characteristics and inputoutput relations, likely to cover all these cases? (Reitman, 1970, p. 485)
       [Semantic memory] Is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations. Semantic memory does not register perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input signals. (Tulving, 1972, p. 386)
       The mnemonic code, far from being fixed and unchangeable, is structured and restructured along with general development. Such a restructuring of the code takes place in close dependence on the schemes of intelligence. The clearest indication of this is the observation of different types of memory organisation in accordance with the age level of a child so that a longer interval of retention without any new presentation, far from causing a deterioration of memory, may actually improve it. (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. 36)
       4) The Logic of Some Memory Theorization Is of Dubious Worth in the History of Psychology
       If a cue was effective in memory retrieval, then one could infer it was encoded; if a cue was not effective, then it was not encoded. The logic of this theorization is "heads I win, tails you lose" and is of dubious worth in the history of psychology. We might ask how long scientists will puzzle over questions with no answers. (Solso, 1974, p. 28)
       We have iconic, echoic, active, working, acoustic, articulatory, primary, secondary, episodic, semantic, short-term, intermediate-term, and longterm memories, and these memories contain tags, traces, images, attributes, markers, concepts, cognitive maps, natural-language mediators, kernel sentences, relational rules, nodes, associations, propositions, higher-order memory units, and features. (Eysenck, 1977, p. 4)
       The problem with the memory metaphor is that storage and retrieval of traces only deals [ sic] with old, previously articulated information. Memory traces can perhaps provide a basis for dealing with the "sameness" of the present experience with previous experiences, but the memory metaphor has no mechanisms for dealing with novel information. (Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977, p. 434)
       7) The Results of a Hundred Years of the Psychological Study of Memory Are Somewhat Discouraging
       The results of a hundred years of the psychological study of memory are somewhat discouraging. We have established firm empirical generalisations, but most of them are so obvious that every ten-year-old knows them anyway. We have made discoveries, but they are only marginally about memory; in many cases we don't know what to do with them, and wear them out with endless experimental variations. We have an intellectually impressive group of theories, but history offers little confidence that they will provide any meaningful insight into natural behavior. (Neisser, 1978, pp. 12-13)
       A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the mean ing of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept. (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 34)
       Memory appears to be constrained by a structure, a "syntax," perhaps at quite a low level, but it is free to be variable, deviant, even erratic at a higher level....
       Like the information system of language, memory can be explained in part by the abstract rules which underlie it, but only in part. The rules provide a basic competence, but they do not fully determine performance. (Campbell, 1982, pp. 228, 229)
       When people think about the mind, they often liken it to a physical space, with memories and ideas as objects contained within that space. Thus, we speak of ideas being in the dark corners or dim recesses of our minds, and of holding ideas in mind. Ideas may be in the front or back of our minds, or they may be difficult to grasp. With respect to the processes involved in memory, we talk about storing memories, of searching or looking for lost memories, and sometimes of finding them. An examination of common parlance, therefore, suggests that there is general adherence to what might be called the spatial metaphor. The basic assumptions of this metaphor are that memories are treated as objects stored in specific locations within the mind, and the retrieval process involves a search through the mind in order to find specific memories....
       However, while the spatial metaphor has shown extraordinary longevity, there have been some interesting changes over time in the precise form of analogy used. In particular, technological advances have influenced theoretical conceptualisations.... The original Greek analogies were based on wax tablets and aviaries; these were superseded by analogies involving switchboards, gramophones, tape recorders, libraries, conveyor belts, and underground maps. Most recently, the workings of human memory have been compared to computer functioning... and it has been suggested that the various memory stores found in computers have their counterparts in the human memory system. (Eysenck, 1984, pp. 79-80)
       Primary memory [as proposed by William James] relates to information that remains in consciousness after it has been perceived, and thus forms part of the psychological present, whereas secondary memory contains information about events that have left consciousness, and are therefore part of the psychological past. (Eysenck, 1984, p. 86)
       Once psychologists began to study long-term memory per se, they realized it may be divided into two main categories.... Semantic memories have to do with our general knowledge about the working of the world. We know what cars do, what stoves do, what the laws of gravity are, and so on. Episodic memories are largely events that took place at a time and place in our personal history. Remembering specific events about our own actions, about our family, and about our individual past falls into this category. With amnesia or in aging, what dims... is our personal episodic memories, save for those that are especially dear or painful to us. Our knowledge of how the world works remains pretty much intact. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 42)
       The nature of memory... provides a natural starting point for an analysis of thinking. Memory is the repository of many of the beliefs and representations that enter into thinking, and the retrievability of these representations can limit the quality of our thought. (Smith, 1990, p. 1)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Memory

  • 8 Creativity

       Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)
       Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)
       There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)
       he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)
       he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)
       From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)
       Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)
       The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)
       In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)
       he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)
        11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder
       Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)
       New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)
       [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....
       Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)
       A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....
       Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity

  • 9 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 10 ὄψις

    ὄψις, ἡ, gen. εως, [dialect] Ion. ιος, ([etym.] ὄπωπα):
    I objective, aspect, appearance of a person or thing,

    πατρὸς φίλου ὄψιν ἀτυχθείς Il.6.468

    ;

    εἰσορόων ὄ. τ' ἀγαθὴν καὶ μῦθον ἀκούων 24.632

    , cf. S.Ph. 1412 (anap.);

    δῶρον, οὐ σπουδαῖον εἰς ὄ. Id.OC 577

    ; πλείω τὴν ὄ. παρείχετο made the appearance greater, Th.6.46;

    ἀξιόλογον ὄ. παρέχεται τὸ δένδρος PCair.Zen. 157.4

     (iii B. C.);

    ὥστε ὄ. καλὴν φαίνεσθαι X.An.5.9.9

    ;

    εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς φανερᾶς ὄ. Th.1.10

    ;

    τὴν ὄ. τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν Id.7.44

    : the acc. is used abs., in appearance,

    τῷ ὄψιν ἐειδόμενος Pi.N.10.15

    ;

    στρογγύλος τὴν ὄ. Hermipp.4

    ;

    ἀστειότατον τὴν ὄ. Alex.59

    ; καλός τε κἀγαθὸς τὴν ὄ. Pl.Prm. 127b; ἀπὸ τῆς ὄ. Ἑλληνικός to judge from his looks, Antiph. 33.2; so

    ἐκ τῆς ὄ. POxy. 37 ii 3

     (i A. D.).
    b countenance, face, E. Med. 905, Pl.Phdr. 240d, 254b, etc.; διοίδησις ὅλης ὄ. Herod.Med. in Rh.Mus.58.83, cf. Sor.1.44, Philum. ap. Aët.9.7; οὐκ ἄξιον ἀπ' ὄψεως οὔτε φιλεῖν οὔτε μισεῖν οὐδένα by the face or look merely, Lys.16.19; ἀδήλως τῇ ὄ. πλασάμενος so that nothing could be learnt from his countenance, Th.6.58;

    τίνι δεδούλωταί ποτε; ὄψει Men.541.2

    : pl., Alex.98.6, Anaxandr.41.38.
    c visual impression or image of an object, Pl.Tht. 193c.
    2 thing seen, sight,

    φοβερὰν ὄ. προσιδέσθαι A.Pers.48

     (anap.), cf. Supp. 567 (lyr.);

    ὁρῶ Πυλάδην.., ἡδεῖαν ὄ. E.Or. 727

    , cf. Pl.Lg. 887d, etc.; ἄλλην ὄ. οἰκοδομημάτων other architectural sights, Hdt.2.136; τὰ δὲ χρήματα.. ἔστιν ὄψις mere outside show, Antiph.33.2;

    πολλὴν ὄ. παρασχόντα ἔπειτα μηδὲν ὠφελῆσαι Hp. Art.44

    ; of scenic representations, Arist.Po. 1453b1, al.; ὁ τῆς ὄ. κόσμος ib. 1449b33: pl., ib. 1462a16.
    3 vision, apparition, Hdt.1.39, etc.;

    ὄ. ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ Id.3.30

    , al.;

    ὄ. ἐνυπνίου Id.8.54

    ;

    ὄ. ὀνείρου Id.1.38

    ;

    ὄ. ἔννυχοι A.Pr. 645

    , cf. Ag. 425 (lyr.), S.El. 413, E.Hec.72 (lyr.), IG42(1).121.11 (Epid., iv B. C.), etc.
    II subjective, power of sight or seeing, vision, ὄψει τινὰ ἰδεῖν, ἐσιδεῖν, Il.20.205, Od.25.94, cf. Heraclit.55, Democr.11, Emp.4.10, Th.7.75, etc.; τῆς ἐμῆς ὄ. Hdt.2.99, 147;

    τῆς ὄ. στερηθῆναι Id.9.93

    , etc.; οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον

    ὄψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκουσθέν Th.3.38

    ; οὐ καθορωμένους τῇ ὄ. νυκτὸς οὔσης ib. 112.
    b act of seeing or looking,

    ἡ εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὄ. Pl.Cra. 396b

    ; sense of sight, Arist.de An. 428a6, Mete. 369b9; τὰ διὰ τῆς ὄ., of pleasures, Id.EN 1118a3, etc.
    c pl., organs of sight, eyes, ὄψεις μαρᾶναι to quench the orbs of sight, S.OT 1328, cf. Ant.52, Heraclit. 26;

    τὸ κάλλος πάντων εἷλκε τὰς ὄ. ἐπ' αὐτόν X.Smp.1.9

    ; ἀσθενῖ ( = -εῖ) τὰς ὄ. POxy.911.6 (iii A. D.): so in sg., ἐστερήθη τῆς μιᾶς ὄ. Plb.3.79.12: sg. in collective sense, the eyes, [ ἰχθῦς] λευκὴν ἔχοντες τὴν ὄ. Arist. HA 602a11, cf. PA 656b29.
    d Medic., iris of the eye, Hp.Prorrh. 2.19 (but eye-ball or eye, Id.Prog.7 (pl.)); also, pupil, Ruf.Onom. 23.
    e of the visual rays which were supposed to proceed from the eyes, Pl.Ti. 45c, 46b, Arist.Mete. 343a13, 370a19: in other places Arist. controverted this Empedoclean theory, Sens. 437b14.
    2 view, sight, ἀπικνέεσθαι ἐς ὄψιν τινί come into one's sight, i.e. presence, Hdt.1.136; εἰς ὄψιν τινὸς or τινὶ ἥκειν, μολεῖν, ἐλθεῖν, περᾶν, A.Ch. 215, Pers. 183, E.Med. 173 (anap.), Or. 513; καλέσαι τινὰ ἐς ὄ. Hdt.5.106; ἀποφαίνειν τί τινι ἐς ὄ. Id.4.81;

    λυπηρὰς τῇ ὄ. ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι Th.2.37

    ;

    ἐν ὄ. τοῦ δήμου Plu.TG12

    ; κατ' ὄψιν in person, ὡς ἐνετειλάμην σοι κατ' ὄ. as I enjoined you when with you, POxy.1154.4 (i A. D.), cf. 117.3 (ii/iii A. D.), etc.
    b dignity, position,

    κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ὄ. καὶ ὑπόλημψιν PLond.1.77.59

     (vi A. D.); ἡ τῶν γονέων ἡμῶν προτεραία ὄ. PMasp. 2 iii6 (vi A. D.).

    Greek-English dictionary (Αγγλικά Ελληνικά-λεξικό) > ὄψις

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